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Introduction	
This	paper	explores	 the	 relationship	between	 law	and	neoliberalism	 in	 the	 context	of	contemporary	social	policy.	Among	the	many	areas	to	be	affected	by	the	emergence	of	neoliberalism	as	the	guiding	philosophy	of	today’s	politics,	welfare	has	been	one	of	the	most	 prominent	 and	 controversial.	 The	 nature	 of	 the	 changes	 within	 the	 sphere	 of	welfare	 that	 have	 accompanied	 the	 shift	 to	 a	 neoliberal	 politics	 have	 been	 charted	extensively.	 Increasing	 privatisation	 and	 marketisation	 of	 social	 services;	 the	importance	attached	to	the	empowerment	of	those	who	use	social	services	by	extending	their	range	of	choices	and	opportunities	to	provide	feedback	on	their	experiences;	the	rise	 in	 the	 importance	of	 league	 tables	within	 the	National	Health	Service	 in	 the	UK	–	these	 are	 just	 some	 of	 the	 features	 characteristic	 of	 the	 application	 of	 neoliberalism	within	the	spheres	of	welfare	and	social	services.	While	these	have	been	the	subject	of	a	voluminous	 critical	 literature	 in	 the	 fields	 of	 politics,	 sociology,	 social	 policy,	 and	economics,	 academic	 lawyers	 have	 tended	 to	 concentrate	 on	 the	 implications	 of	 such	developments	 for	 the	 law	within	 their	 particular	 legal	 sub-disciplines,	 such	 as	 health	care	 law	 and	 housing	 law.	 There	 has	 been	 comparatively	 little	 work	 undertaken	 by	lawyers	 exploring	 what	 these	 types	 of	 developments	 in	 welfare	 and	 social	 services	
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might	reveal	more	generally	about	the	manner	in	which	law	shapes,	and	is	shaped	by,	neoliberalism	and	the	neoliberal	state.	This	essay	offers	some	preliminary	reflections	on	this	wider	issue.	
The	 paper	 has	 three	 objectives.	 First,	 it	 aims	 to	 identify	 the	 types	 of	 law	 and	 legal	categories	to	be	found	in	two	areas	of	contemporary	social	policy	–	unemployment	and	health	care.	Secondly,	it	explores	the	form	and	underlying	logic	of	those	laws	and	legal	categories	 and	 seeks	 to	 explain	 how	 these	 contribute,	 in	 a	 constitutive	 way,	 to	 the	development	 and	 maintenance	 of	 neoliberalism	 and	 the	 neoliberal	 state.	 Finally,	 the	essay	aims	to	place	the	foregoing	analysis	in	the	context	of	literature	that	comprehends	neoliberalism	as	a	political	project	that	involves	a	central	role	for	the	state	and	a	range	of	 institutional	 means	 that	 are	 devised	 and	 deployed	 to	 further	 the	 goals	 of	neoliberalism.	
‘Crafting	the	Neoliberal	State’	
One	of	the	myths	surrounding	neoliberalism	is	that	it	envisages	a	minimal	role	for	the	state.	This	myth,	peddled	by	advocates	and	critics	of	neoliberalism	alike,	 confuses	 the	arguments	about	laissez-faire	and	the	minimal	state	advanced	by	adherents	of	classical	liberalism	in	the	19th	century	with	the	more	nuanced	views	on	the	state	propounded	by	theorists	of	neoliberalism.	Of	course,	the	goal	of	proponents	of	neoliberalism	is	to	create	a	society	founded	upon	the	market	–	a	market	order	–	but	this	is	not	incompatible	with	a	 strong	 state;	 indeed,	 it	 demands	 a	 strong,	 active	 state	 to	 construct	 the	 necessary	conditions	for	the	establishment	and	maintenance	of	that	market	order.	Thus,	inter	alia,	the	 state	 must	 create	 markets	 where	 they	 do	 not	 already	 exist	 and	 ensure	 their	continued	operation;	guarantee	property	rights;	and	ensure	the	absence	of	monopolies.	
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But	 it	 needs	 to	 do	 more	 than	 this	 to	 ensure	 that	 societies	 function	 on	 the	 basis	 of	markets.	The	state	must	also	shape	social	relations	accordingly	and	construct	a	specific	worldview	that	enables	the	market	to	define	the	manner	in	which	societies	operate	in	practice.	 As	 Loïc	 Wacquant	 has	 noted:	 ‘[W]hat	 is	 ‘neo’	 about	 neoliberalism	 [is]	 the	reengineering	and	redeployment	of	the	state	as	the	core	agency	that	sets	the	rules	and	fabricates	 the	 subjectivities,	 social	 relations	 and	 collective	 representations	 suited	 to	realising	markets.’1	
Wacquant’s	 analysis	 of	 neoliberalism	 is	 helpful	 for	 two	 reasons.	 First,	 in	 emphasising	the	importance	of	the	state,	he	identifies	neoliberalism	as	a	political,	as	opposed	to	an	economic,	project.	In	other	words,	while	the	establishment	of	a	market	order	is	the	goal	of	 neoliberalism,	 this	 is	 accomplished	 through	 politics,	 rather	 than	 the	 product	 of	neoclassical	economics.	Secondly,	he	points	to	the	need	to	develop	‘a	‘thick’	sociological	conception’	of	neoliberalism	that	identifies	both	the	institutional	means	deployed	by	the	state	 to	establish,	maintain,	and	 impose	 the	market	order	on	society,	and	 the	 types	of	consequences	this	has	for	citizenship.	For	Wacquant,	those	institutional	means	are	not	confined	to	the	rules	of	the	marketplace,	but	also	include	the	criminal	justice	system	–	especially	 the	 prison;	 the	 ‘disciplinary’	 social	 policy	 of	 workfare;	 and	 the	 ‘trope	 of	individual	 responsibility’.	 Whether	 or	 not	 one	 agrees	 with	 the	 relevance	 of	 the	particular	 institutional	means	 or	 ‘logics’	 he	 identifies,	 this	manner	 of	 conceptualising	neoliberalism	 and	 what	 he	 calls	 the	 crafting	 of	 the	 neoliberal	 state	 succeeds	 in	highlighting	 the	 importance	of	 concrete	 state	 institutional	mechanisms	 in	 shaping	 the	material	 (e.g.	 the	 construction	 of	 new	markets)	 and	 symbolic	 (‘the	 capacity	 that	 the	state	 has	 to	 trace	 salient	 social	 demarcations	 and	 produce	 social	 reality	 through	 its																																																									
1	L	Wacquant	‘Three	Steps	to	a	Historical	Anthropology	of	Actually	Existing	Neoliberalism’	(2012)	20(1)	Social	
Anthropology	66-79,	p.	66.	
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work	 of	 inculcation	 of	 efficient	 categories	 and	 classifications’2)	 components	 of	 those	phenomena.	 If	 we	 wish	 to	 understand	 market	 societies,	 we	 need	 to	 attend	 to	 the	different	ways	and	means	through	which	the	state	constructs	these.	
How	does	law	fit	within	this	analysis	of	neoliberalism	and	the	crafting	of	the	neoliberal	state?	While	Wacquant	himself	includes	(presumably	the	criminal)	courts	as	part	of	the	penal	 wing	 of	 the	 neoliberal	 state	 that	 he	 explores	 in	 his	 recent	 work,	 there	 is	 little	discussion	 of	 the	 role	 that	 these,	 or	 law	 and	 legal	 categories	more	 generally,	 play	 in	neoliberalism	and	the	construction	of	 the	neoliberal	state.	And	yet	 for	 the	pioneers	of	neoliberalism	 law	 was	 to	 play	 a	 foundational	 role	 in	 the	 development	 and	implementation	of	the	neoliberal	vision.	Two	dimensions	of	this	can	be	identified.	First,	for	neoliberals,	markets	are	creatures	of	law.	Their	existence	demands,	and	depends	on,	the	presence	of	a	legal	framework	suited	to	this	end.	In	Marxist	terms,	though	contrary	to	 traditional	Marxist	 teachings,	 law,	 in	 this	vision,	 is	not	a	part	of	 the	superstructure	determined	by	 the	economic	base;	 rather,	 law	 is	an	 inherent	aspect	of	 the	base	–	 law	founds	the	market	order,	rather	than	being	determined	by	it.	This	has	consequences	for	common	assumptions	surrounding	the	nature	of	economic	entities	and	their	regulation.	Thus,	the	property	bought	and	sold	on	the	market,	the	contracts	through	which	the	sale	and	purchase	are	made,	and	the	companies	involved	in	selling	and	buying	the	property	are	all,	in	the	first	instance,	legal	entities,	rather	than,	as	is	commonly	assumed,	objects	that	exist	outside	of	the	law	and	are	only	subsequently	regulated,	or	not,	by	the	law.	As	Walter	 Lippmann,	 whose	 eponymous	 Colloquium	 is	 often	 cited	 as	 constituting	 the	beginnings	of	neoliberalism,	wrote:	
Only	by	 recognizing	 that	 legal	 rights	are	declared	and	enforced	by	 the	 state	 is	 it	possible	 to	make	a																																																									
2	L	Wacquant	Punishing	the	Poor:	The	Neoliberal	Government	of	Social	Insecurity	(Durham	and	London:	Duke	
University	Press,	2009),	p.	xvi.	
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rational	examination	of	the	value	of	any	particular	legal	right.	The	latter-day	liberals	did	not	see	this.	They	fell	into	a	deep	and	confusing	error	when	they	failed	to	see	that	property,	contracts,	corporations,	as	well	as	governments,	electorates,	and	courts,	are	creatures	of	law,	and	have	no	existence	except	as	bundles	of	enforceable	rights	and	duties.3	Secondly,	 law	must	 take	 the	 form	of	 a	 set	 of	 formal	 abstract	 general	 rules	 that	 apply	equally	to	everyone’s	conduct.	This	is	necessary	because	the	market	order	is	based	on	the	idea	that	individuals	are	free	to	pursue	their	different	objectives	via	the	market.	The	alternative	 –	 social	 law	 –	 defeats	 this	 purpose	 as	 it	 involves	 the	 creation	 of	 rules	designed	 to	 further	 a	 particular,	 pre-determined	 end	 such	 as	 the	 redistribution	 of	wealth	 between	 classes.	 Here,	 law	 would	 prescribe	 individual	 conduct	 rather	 than	respect	liberty	of	action.	The	market	order,	then,	is	what	Hayek	refers	to	as	a	nomocracy	(governed	by	law),	as	opposed	to	a	teleocracy	(governed	by	an	end	or	ends).	It	is	what	he	called	a	 ‘private	law	society’	where	the	formal	abstract	general	rules	–	the	 ‘rules	of	just	 conduct’	 –	 that	 constitute	 the	 market	 order	 are	 synonymous	 with	 ‘the	 essential	content	 of	 all	 contemporary	 systems	 of	 private	 law,	 [“]freedom	 of	 contract,	 the	inviolability	of	property,	and	the	duty	to	compensate	for	damage	due	to	his	fault[”].’4	In	his	 influential	book	The	Road	to	Serfdom,	Hayek	was	already	 setting	out	 this	vision	of	law	in	the	course	of	his	argument	that	competition	–	the	defining	norm	of	neoliberalism	and	what	Hayek	called	‘the	principle	of	social	organisation’	–	required	a	rigorous	legal	framework	 for	 its	successful	and	beneficial	operation.	 It	was	a	crucial	part	of	what	he	endorsed	 as	 the	 state’s	 ‘planning	 for	 competition’,	 as	 opposed	 to	 ‘planning	 against	competition’,	which	involved	the	‘central	direction	of	all	economic	activity	according	to	
																																																								
3	W	Lippmann	An	Enquiry	into	the	Principles	of	the	Good	Society,	quoted	in	P	Dardot	and	C	Laval	The	New	Way	
of	the	World:	On	Neoliberal	Society	(London:	Verso,	2013),	p.	59.	
4	F	A	Hayek	Law,	Legislation	and	Liberty:	A	New	Statement	of	the	Liberal	Principles	of	Justice	and	Political	
Economy	(London	and	New	York:	Routledge,	2013),	p.	206,	referring	to	Leon	Duguit	as	described	by	J	Walter	
Jones	Historical	Introduction	to	the	Theory	of	Law	(Oxford:	OUP,	1940),	p.	114.	
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a	single	plan,	laying	down	how	the	resources	of	society	should	be	“consciously	directed”	to	serve	particular	ends	in	a	definite	way.’5	
The	foregoing	discussion	identifies	themes	that	provide	a	useful	context	for	the	analysis	of	the	relationship	between	law,	social	policy,	and	the	neoliberal	state	in	the	remainder	of	the	essay.	What	types	of	law	and	legal	categories	do	we	encounter	in	the	design	and	implementation	 of	 social	 policy	 in	 the	 two	 areas	 explored	 here	 –	 unemployment	 and	health	care?	What	forms	and	logics	structure	those	laws	and	legal	categories?	And	how	do	 those	 forms	 and	 logics	 function	 both	 materially	 and	 symbolically	 to	 shape	 the	neoliberal	vision	and	help	 craft	 the	neoliberal	 state?	These	are	 the	 types	of	questions	with	which	the	essay	engages.	
Unemployment	and	Workfare	
Workfare	 schemes	 –	 which	 operate	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 access	 to	 welfare	 benefits	 is	conditional	 on	 undertaking	work	 or	work-related	 activities	 –	 have	 become	 important	mechanisms	 through	 which	 increasing	 numbers	 of	 governments	 manage	unemployment	and	the	unemployed.	While	the	 justification	advanced	by	governments	for	such	schemes	is	that	engagement	in	work	is	the	surest	means	of	escaping	poverty,	critical	commentators	have	identified	a	number	of	other	reasons	for	their	existence.	One	of	 these	 sees	 a	 transformation	 in	 the	 nature	 of	 social	 policy	 from	 one	 that	 protected	those	 in	need	 from	the	deleterious	social	and	economic	consequences	of	capitalism	to	one	that	is	driven	primarily	by	economic	policy	and	the	needs	of	capitalism.6	This	latter	characterisation	 describes	 the	 impact	 on	 social	 policy	 of	 the	 requirement	 of	 states	 to	reduce	 their	 social	 spending	 in	 order	 to	 remain	 economically	 competitive	within	 the																																																									
5	F	A	Hayek	The	Road	to	Serfdom	(London:	Routledge,	1944),	p.	26.	
6	See,	for	e.g.,	B.	Jessop,	The	Future	of	the	Capitalist	State	(Cambridge:	Polity,	2002).	
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global	 economy.	 One	 way	 of	 doing	 this	 is	 to	 ensure	 the	 unemployed	 are	 ultimately	removed	 from	 the	welfare	 rolls	 and	 (re-)engage	 in	 the	 flexible	 and	 casualised	 labour	market	characteristic	of	our	contemporary	era.	While	acknowledging	the	link	between	workfare	and	capital,	 others	are	 less	willing	 to	view	economics	as	 the	determinant	of	this	 social	 policy.	 For	 them,	workfare	 is	 as	much	 about	 a	 shift	 from	 a	 protective	 to	 a	disciplinary	form	of	social	policy	focused	on	transforming	the	ways	in	which	individuals	behave,	as	it	is	about	the	economy.	The	unemployed	must	be	trained	to	accept	the	low	wages	 of	 the	 labour	 in	which	workfare	 recipients	mostly	 find	 themselves;	 they	must	learn	that	they	are	individually	responsible	for	their	predicaments	–	whether	these	are	positive	or	negative;	and	they	must	conceive	of	themselves	as	competitors	and	life	as	a	competition.	 Whatever	 one’s	 views	 of	 the	 merits	 of	 those	 different	 ways	 of	conceptualising	 workfare,	 what	 is	 clear	 is	 that	 the	 features	 identified	 by	 both	 are	indelibly	characteristic	of	neoliberalism	and	the	neoliberal	state.	
The	 form	through	which	workfare	operates	 is	 contract.	 Initially	 called	 the	 Jobseekers’	Agreement,	after	the	passing	of	the	Welfare	Reform	Act	2012,	this	is	now	known	as	the	‘claimant	commitment’.	Essentially,	benefit	 claimants	must	sign	a	contract	 that	details	the	 type	 of	 work	 being	 sought	 and	 the	 steps	 to	 be	 taken	 in	 looking	 for	 work	 and	 in	improving	one’s	 chances	of	 securing	work.	While	 the	philosophy	of	 conditionality	has	underpinned	unemployment	legislation	for	many	years,7	the	use	of	contract	as	the	form	of	workfare	is	novel.	
There	are	a	number	of	ways	in	which	the	use	of	contract	in	this	context	feeds	in	to,	and	furthers,	 the	 neoliberal	 project.	 First,	 while	 not	 a	 legal	 contract	 per	 se,	 the	 workfare	contract	aligns	the	management	of	the	social	and	economic	problem	of	unemployment																																																									
7	Though	it	was	never	invoked	in	practice	in	the	UK	in	the	way	in	which	it	has	been	since	the	mid-1990s.	Until	
then,	access	to	unemployment	benefits	was	basically	viewed	as	a	social	right.	
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to	 the	 type	 of	 liberal	 political	 rationality	 underpinning	 the	 classical	 private	 law	 of	contract	 –	which,	 as	we	 saw	earlier,	 neoliberal	 theorists	 such	as	Hayek	view	as	 a	key	legal	 institution	 framing	 the	 neoliberal	 vision.	 This	 rationality	 stresses	 notions	 of	individual	 liberty,	 individual	responsibility	and	 fault,	and	the	voluntary	consent	of	 the	individual.	The	rational,	self-determining	agent,	who	makes	autonomous	choices	about	whether	 to	 enter	 into	 agreements	 based	 upon	 self-assessments	 of	 individual	 utility,	underpins	 this	 rationality.	As	 such,	 the	workfare	 contract	does	not,	 in	 theory	at	 least,	compel	welfare	 beneficiaries	 to	 sign	 up	 to	 it;	 rather	 it	 emphasises	 the	 importance	 of	consent,	negotiation	and	reciprocity	 in	 the	construction	of	 the	agreement.	The	 idea	of	contract	as	a	binding	agreement	freely	made	in	the	marketplace	between	formally	equal	contracting	parties	(pacta	sunt	servanda)	lies	at	the	heart	of	workfare.	That	this	liberal	rationality	pertains	 in	 the	context	of	workfare	 is	evidenced	by	 the	sanctions	 that	 flow	from	a	breach	of	 the	contract.	Failure	 to	comply	with	 the	duties	 therein	results	 in	 the	progressive	 withholding	 of	 a	 claimant’s	 benefits,	 whatever	 the	 consequences, 8	indicating	that	individual	fault	expressed	in	the	failure	to	keep	one’s	promises	lies	at	the	root	of	this	contract.	
Secondly,	 this	 liberal	 construction	 of	 the	 workfare	 contract	 feeds	 into	 the	 neoliberal	form	of	social	relations	and	subjectivities	being	shaped	by	the	state.	Thus,	the	focus	on	individual	responsibility	and	self-reliance	corresponds	to	the	idea	behind	the	so-called	social	investment	state	in	which	the	state	invests	in	individuals’	human	capital	through	education	and	training,	rather	than	providing	them	with	economic	benefits.	Individuals	actively	work	on	themselves	and	create	individual	plans	of	action	with	a	view	to	being	in	a	position	to	compete	in	the	labour	market.	They	are	no	longer	passive	recipients	of																																																									
8	For	an	indication	of	the	types	of	consequences	flowing	from	such	a	breach,	see	A	Gentleman	‘‘No	one	should	
die	penniless	and	alone’:	the	victims	of	Britain’s	harsh	welfare	sanctions’,	The	Guardian,	3rd	August	2014		
(http://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/aug/03/victims-britains-harsh-welfare-sanctions).	
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welfare	 but	 active	 entrepreneurs	 acting	 on	 their	 own	 initiative	 and	 able	 to	 carve	 out	opportunities	for	themselves	in	the	market.	
Thirdly,	 related	 to,	 but	 beyond,	 the	 formation	 of	 subjectivities,	 the	 mechanism	 of	contract	 enables	 the	 state	 to	 produce	 in	 reality	 powerful	 classifications	 of	 the	unemployed.	 In	 the	 present	 context,	 the	 liberal	 political	 rationality	 underlying	 the	workfare	 contract,	 with	 its	 emphasis	 on	 individual	 responsibility,	 voluntary	 consent,	and	the	honouring	of	promises	lends	the	politics	of	unemployment	a	moral	dimension	that	 structures	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 society	 perceives	 this	 phenomenon.	 This	 is	especially	clear	in	the	context	of	the	government’s	sanctions	regime,	which	provides	for	the	progressive	withdrawal	of	economic	benefits	 from	claimants	who	fail	 to	discharge	their	 contractual	 duties.	 This	 enables	 the	 resurrection	 of	 the	 old	 classification	 of	 the	poor	into	the	‘deserving’	and	the	‘undeserving’.	Those	who	fail	to	fulfil	their	obligations	are	not	only	deprived	of	the	material	resources	by	which	to	live,	thereby	exacerbating	their	poverty;	importantly,	they	are	also	deemed	to	be	undeserving	–	a	morally	loaded	term	often	 synonymous	with	 characterisations	of	 those	 individuals	 as,	 inter	alia,	 lazy,	work-shy,	 and	 benefit	 fraudsters.	 This	 cleavage	 illustrates	 the	 symbolic	 dimension	 of	the	state’s	deployment	of	contract	within	the	context	of	workfare,	which	takes	the	form	of	maintaining	 and	 deepening	 the	 social	 divides	 between	morally	 upstanding	 citizens	and	the	immoral	who	fail	to	live	up	to	the	norms	associated	with	workfare.	The	state’s	use	 of	 contract	 as	 an	 institutional	 mechanism	 by	 which	 to	 manage	 unemployment	therefore	succeeds,	in	Wacquant’s	words,	in	‘produc[ing]	social	reality	through	its	work	of	inculcation	of	efficient	categories	and	classifications’.9	
																																																								
9	Wacquant,	op	cit.,	note	2.	
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Finally,	 the	 foregoing	 symbolic	 effects	 of	 the	 workfare	 contract	 contribute	 to	 the	legitimation	of	neoliberalism	and	the	neoliberal	state	by	working	to	obscure	a	number	of	 controversial	 features	 surrounding	 the	management	 of	 unemployment.	 Here	 are	 a	few.	First,	at	the	level	of	the	making	of	the	contract	itself,	they	divert	attention	from	the	fact	 that	 it	 is	 highly	 questionable	 whether	 the	 workfare	 contract	 is	 a	 contract	 at	 all.	Peter	 Vincent-Jones,	 for	 instance,	 has	 argued	 that	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 call	 the	 Jobseekers’	Agreement	a	contract	as	it	complies	poorly	with	a	number	of	common	contract	norms,	including	reciprocity	(the	 idea	 that	both	parties	benefit	 from	the	contract	 through	the	mutual	exchange	of	acts	or	promises),	consent	(the	notion	that	parties	voluntarily	enter	into	agreements	rather	than	being	coerced	to	do	so),	and	choice	or	freedom	of	contract	(that	 parties	 are	 free	 to	 determine	 the	 nature	 of	 their	 contractual	 obligations).	 He	argues	that	the	latter,	 for	example,	 is	 largely	a	myth	as	genuine	options	are	frequently	not	offered	to	jobseekers	in	practice.	Similarly,	consent	is	more	theoretical	than	real	as	welfare	recipients	have	little	alternative	but	to	accept	the	terms	of	the	Agreement	–	at	least	if	they	wish	to	have	access	to	basic	material	resources.10	As	a	result,	Vincent-Jones	has	noted	the	coercive,	as	opposed	to	voluntary,	nature	of	the	so-called	contracts	in	the	field	of	social	policy.11	Their	imposition	by	the	state	for	concrete	policy	ends	dilutes	the	component	 of	 individual	 autonomous	 choice	 characteristic	 of	 freedom	 of	 contract.12	Here,	 we	 encounter	 one	 of	 the	 ‘institutional	 logics’	 –	 disciplinary	 social	 policy	 –	Wacquant	identifies	as	being	characteristic	of	the	reengineering	of	the	state	that	defines																																																									
10	See	P	Vincent-Jones	The	New	Public	Contracting:	Regulation,	Responsiveness,	Relationality	(Oxford:	OUP,	
2006),	Ch.	9,	and	P	Vincent-Jones	‘Contractual	Governance:	Institutional	and	Organizational	Analysis’	(2000)	
20(3)	Oxford	Journal	of	Legal	Studies	317-51.	Further	sceptical	analysis	of	the	workfare	‘contract’	along	these	
lines	can	be	found	in	M	Freedland	and	D	King	‘Contractual	Governance	and	Illiberal	Contracts:	Some	Problems	
of	Contractualism	as	an	Instrument	of	Behaviour	Management	by	Agencies	of	Government’	(2003)	27(3)	
Cambridge	Journal	of	Economics	465-77.	
11	See	Vincent-Jones	The	New	Public	Contracting,	ibid.	
12	See	D	Campbell	‘Relational	Contract	and	the	Nature	of	Private	Ordering:	A	Comment	on	Vincent-Jones’	
(2007)	14(2)	Indiana	Journal	of	Global	Legal	Studies	279-300.	In	Campbell’s	view,	this	‘erosion	of	the	individual	
dimension	of	contract’,	together	with	the	fact	that	social	policy	contracts	disguise	‘the	hierarchical	coercion	
that	is	the	identifying	feature	of	state	intervention’,	mean	that	these	‘contracts’	are	not	contracts	at	all.	
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neoliberalism.	The	precise	effect	of	 the	deployment	of	contract	here	 is	 to	obscure	 this	authoritarian	 dimension	 of	 the	 neoliberal	 state	 as	 its	 underlying	 liberal	 political	rationality	 succeeds	 in	 directing	 one’s	 focus	 towards	 the	 behavior	 of	 unemployed	individuals	and	the	degree	to	which	they	abide	by	their	‘freely’	made	obligations.	
The	second,	hidden	issue	is	the	trajectory	of	those	on	workfare.	Empirical	analyses	on	this	point	 identify	key	 structural	 factors	–	 such	as	 class,	poor	education,	 and	 the	 low-paid	 and	 precarious	 nature	 of	 the	 labour	 market	 –	 that	 impede	 the	 permanent	 and	successful	 re-integration	 into	 society	 of	 many	 of	 those	 on	 workfare,	 but	 cannot	 be	addressed	 via	 the	 workfare	 contract. 13 	What	 is	 secured	 through	 the	 assimilation	characteristic	of	workfare	is	not	necessarily	an	escape	from	poverty	and	the	heightened	possibility	of	de-socialisation	that	poverty	engenders,	but	its	entrenchment	and	ongoing	production	 as	 a	 result	 of	 low-skilled	 and	 poorly	 paid	 labour.	 Discipline	 here	 is	 not	confined	 to	 the	 signing	 of	 the	 workfare	 contract;	 it	 extends	 to	 the	 insertion	 of	 the	unemployed	 into	 the	 casualised	 and	 insecure	 forms	 of	 labour	 that	 characterise	 the	flexible	 labour	markets	 that,	 as	we	 saw	 earlier,	 are	 a	 product	 of	 neoliberal	 economic	policies.	The	point	here	 is	not	only	 that	 the	workfare	contract	does	not	address	 those	structural	factors;	the	symbolic	effects	it	produces	also	mean	that	those	factors	remain	entirely	absent	from	the	state’s	politics,	and	policies,	of	unemployment.	
The	final,	related,	point	revolves	around	this	reference	to	the	politics	of	unemployment.	It	 is	suggested	that	 there	 is	something	of	a	paradox	here.	Thus,	while	neoliberalism	is	best	understood	as	a	political	project,	one	of	its	concrete	effects	is	to	depoliticise	issues.	In	 the	 current	 context,	 this	 politics	 of	 depoliticisation	 takes	 the	 form	 not	 only	 of	 the	obscuration	of	 the	 types	of	structural	 factors	mentioned	above,	but	as	a	result	of	 this,																																																									
13	See,	for	example,	M	Carpenter,	B	Freda	and	S	Speeden	(eds.)	Beyond	the	Workfare	State:	Labour	Markets,	
Equality	and	Human	Rights	(Bristol:	The	Policy	Press,	2007).	
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the	 suppression	 of	 potential	 struggles	 and	 conflicts	 over	 the	 meaning	 and	 causes	 of	unemployment.	While	in	fact	remaining	fundamentally	political	insofar	as	they	continue	to	 structure	 the	 power	 relations	 surrounding	 unemployment	 and	 the	 fates	 of	 the	unemployed,	 questions	 of	 political	 economy,	 class,	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 labour	 market,	education,	 and	 the	 bureaucratic	 compulsion	 to	 meet	 targets	 are	 removed	 from	 the	state’s	 politics	 of	 unemployment	 via	 a	 social	 policy	 that	 succeeds	 in	 reducing	 this	phenomenon	to	an	 issue	of	morality.	Moreover,	 the	state’s	power	to	shape	the	mental	structures	 and	 classifications	 surrounding	 unemployment	 tends	 to	 naturalise	 our	thinking	 about,	 and	 response	 to,	 it	 and	 removes	 the	need	 to	 challenge	 the	manner	 in	which	it	is	constructed.	It	is	the	resurrection	of	this	agonistic	dimension	of	politics	in	the	sphere	of	welfare	and	social	policy	 that	must	be	reasserted	as	a	means	of	 challenging	the	politics	of	depoliticisation	that	characterise	the	neoliberal	state.	
Health	Care	
It	 was	 noted	 earlier	 that	 markets	 are	 creatures	 of	 law	 and	 that	 neoliberal	 theorists	stress	 the	 importance	 of	 a	 legal	 framework	 of	 formal	 abstract	 general	 rules	 for	 the	establishment	 and	 successful	 operation	 of	 the	 market	 order.	 While	 those	 theorists	mainly	had	 in	mind	markets	 in	which	private	actors	or	agencies	competed	 for	market	share,	this	section	will	consider	the	role	of	markets	and	the	private	sector	in	a	sphere	in	which,	 traditionally,	 they	 have	 been	 absent.	 This	 is	 the	 publicly	 funded	 health	 care	system	in	the	UK	–	the	National	Health	Service	(NHS).	Since	the	1990s,	social	services	have	become	subject	 to	 the	market	 imperative,	 as	guiding	neoliberal	norms	–	 such	as	competition	and	individual	choice	–	have	spread	from	the	private	to	the	public	sector.	But	what	role	has	law	played	in	this	development?	This	section	addresses	this	question	by	 identifying	some	of	the	ways	 in	which	 law	is	constitutive	of	markets	and	facilitates	
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the	increasing	involvement	of	the	private	sector	within	the	NHS.	Like	the	discussion	of	workfare	earlier,	 the	 focus	will	not	merely	be	on	 identifying	 the	 types	of	 law	 that	are	involved	 here;	 it	 will	 extend	 to	 incorporate	 reflection	 on	 the	 forms	 and	 logics	 that	structure	 those	 laws.	 Let	 us	 begin,	 though,	 with	 two	 examples	 that	 illustrate	 the	expanding	role	of	markets	and	the	private	sector	within	the	NHS.	
The	Health	and	Social	Care	Act	2012	puts	 the	norm	of	competition	at	 the	heart	of	 the	Coalition	 Government’s	 vision	 for	 the	 NHS.	 One	 of	 the	 Act’s	 key	 provisions	 is	 the	replacement	of	Primary	Care	Trusts	with	clinical	commissioning	groups	(CCGs)	as	 the	bodies	responsible	for	commissioning	(purchasing)	most	health	care	services	within	the	NHS	(a	 task	 that	will	 involve	responsibility	 for	spending	£80bn	of	NHS	resources).	By	2016,	it	will	become	possible	for	CCGs	to	outsource	their	commissioning	work	to	non-public	bodies	–	including	private	firms.	A	market	will	therefore	effectively	be	created	for	such	 services	 and	 be	 funded	 from	 the	NHS	 budget.	 The	 legislation	 also	 promotes	 the	‘any	qualified	provider’	approach	to	the	provision	of	NHS	health	care	services	–	meaning	there	will	 be	 increased	 scope	 for,	 inter	alia,	 private	 health	 care	 providers	 to	 become	involved	 in	 the	 provision	 of	 NHS	 health	 care.	 The	 opportunity	 for	 private	 sector	involvement	is	also	heightened	by	the	promotion	of	‘fair	and	effective’	competition	and	the	application	of	competition	law	to	the	commissioning	of	NHS	treatment	for	the	first	time.	The	sector-specific	regulator	for	health	care	–	which	is	called	Monitor	–	is	under	a	duty	 to	 promote	 a	 provision	 of	 health	 care	 services	which	 is	 ‘economic,	 efficient	 and	effective’,	 and	 to	 exercise	 its	 functions	 in	 a	manner	 that	will	 prevent	 anti-competitive	behaviour	in	health	care	provision	that	is	against	patients’	interests.14	It	will	also	be	able	to	 tackle	 specific	 abuses	 and	 unjustifiable	 restrictions	 that	 demonstrably	 act	 against	
																																																								
14	Health	and	Social	Care	Act	2012,	s.62.	
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patients’	 interests	 by	 deploying	 its	 licensing	 powers	 and,	 where	 relevant,	 the	Competition	Act	1998.	The	effect	will	be	to	alter	the	current	situation,	in	which	the	bulk	of	NHS	services	are	commissioned	from	public	bodies,	by	creating	a	level	playing	field	in	which	private	providers	of	health	care	can	compete	to	deliver	NHS	health	care	services.	CCGs	will	 need,	 in	 effect,	 to	 ensure	 that	 a	 tendering	process	 for	 the	provision	of	NHS	services	is	in	place,	if	they	are	not	to	fall	foul	of	competition	law.	
The	second	example	is	the	prominent	role	public-private	partnerships	(PPPs;	formerly	the	 Private	 Finance	 Initiative)	 have	 played	 as	 ways	 of	 funding	 new	 NHS	 hospital	buildings.	 Here,	 private	 contractors	 raise	 the	 money	 to	 finance	 the	 construction	 of	hospitals	for	the	NHS	and,	via	the	PPP	contract,	own	and	manage	the	hospital.	The	NHS	Primary	Care	Trust	leases	the	hospital	and	staff,	such	as	cleaners,	from	the	contractors,	paying	 what	 is	 known	 as	 a	 ‘unitary	 charge’	 for	 these	 from	 their	 annual	 health	 care	budget.	Contracts	last	for	periods	ranging	from	25-30	years,	although	once	they	are	paid	off,	 the	 NHS	 does	 not	 necessarily	 end	 up	 owning	 the	 premises.	 The	 PPP	 scheme	 has	been	the	object	of	cogent	critique.15	As	well	as	being	a	social	cost	in	monetary	terms	–	that	is,	a	mechanism	by	which	to	facilitate	the	accumulation	of	capital	and	profit	via	the	redistribution	of	money	from	public	funds16	–	it	also	has	potential	social	costs	in	human	terms,	 as	 the	 often	 onerous	 contractual	 obligations	 to	 pay	 for	 PPP-financed	 buildings	
																																																								
15	See,	for	instance,	A	M		Pollock	NHS	plc:	The	Privatisation	of	Our	Health	Care	(London:	Verso,	2004).	
16	An	analysis	by	The	Guardian	newspaper	in	2012	found	that	the	current	717	PFI	contracts,	while	having	a	
total	capital	value	of	£54.7bn,	would	have	an	ultimate	cost	of	£301bn	once	paid	off.	See	The	Guardian	(6	July	
2012)	pp.	1	&	18.	As	Hellowell	and	Pollock	note,	one	of	the	reasons	for	this	inflated	cost	is	that	‘the	cost	of	
finance	on	PFI	schemes	is	higher	than	is	the	case	for	publicly	financed	schemes	…’.	M	Hellowell	and	A	M	
Pollock	‘The	Private	Financing	of	NHS	Hospitals:	Politics,	Policy	and	Practice’	(2009)	29	Economic	Affairs	13.	
There	is	also	evidence	of	a	so-called	Secondary	Market	in	PFI	shareholdings	in	hospitals,	schools,	roads	and	
prisons.	See	BBC	Radio	4’s	File	on	4	programme	‘PFI	Profits’,	broadcast	on	19th	June	2011.	
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can	 jeopardise	 the	 existence	 of	 NHS	 hospitals,	 thereby	 endangering	 the	 treatment	 of	patients.17	
Competition	 law	and	contract	 law	obviously	perform	 important	 constitutive	 functions	in	 facilitating	 the	 role	of	 competition,	markets	 and	 the	private	 sector	within	 the	NHS.	But	 beyond	 identifying	 those	 types	 of	 law,	 what	 can	 be	 said	 about	 their	 form	 and	underlying	logic?	To	answer	this	question	it	is	necessary	to	widen	the	frame	of	analysis.	
It	is	worth	beginning	by	noting	the	impact	the	emergence	of	the	welfare	state	had	upon	the	 nature	 of	 the	 form	 of	 law.	 In	 Max	 Weber’s	 analysis	 the	 formal	 rational	 law	 he	identified	 as	 characteristic	 of	 Western	 modernity	 and	 that	 corresponded	 with	 the	emergence	of	the	capitalist	economy	came	under	attack	with	the	development	of	what	he	called	 ‘the	modern	class	problem’.	Unlike	formal	rational	 law,	the	essence	of	which	lay	in	a	system	of	formal	and	abstract	general	rules	that	framed	private	actors’	conduct	and	ensured	the	formal	equality	of	legal	subjects	before	the	law,	what	became	known	as	social	 law	was	a	 legal	 instrumentalist	 form	of	 law	which	was	deployed	as	a	means	 to	redress	 the	 substantive	 inequalities	 between	 classes.18	More	 recently,	 François	 Ewald	has	 argued	 that	 the	 concept	 of	 social	 law	 is	 underpinned	 by	 a	 distinct	 political	rationality	 or	 logic	 –	 namely,	 solidarity	 –	 that	 differs	 from	 the	 classical	 idea	 of	 social	contract,	 which	 is	 based	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 autonomous	 individuals	 who	agree	 to	 create	 a	 State	 the	 purpose	 of	 which	 is	 simply	 to	 guarantee	 contracts	 made	between	 those	 individuals.19	Social	 law	 is	 a	 contractual	 law	 too,	but	 importantly	what	Ewald	calls	solidarity	contracts	are	structured	around	a	logic	that	differs	from	contracts																																																									
17	The	recent	placing	of	South	London	Healthcare	Trust	into	administration	owing	to	an	unsustainable	deficit	
created	by	the	contractual	obligation	to	pay	PFI	costs	is	a	case	in	point.	Also,	see	Hellowell	and	Pollock,	id.	
18	M	Weber	Economy	and	Society:	An	Outline	of	Interpretive	Sociology	(Berkeley,	CA:	University	of	California	
Press,	1978),	Vol.	II.	
19	F	Ewald	‘A	Concept	of	Social	Law’	in	G	Teubner	(ed.)	Dilemmas	of	Law	in	the	Welfare	State	(Berlin:	de	
Gruyter,	1986),	pp.	40-75.	
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of	 the	 private	 law	 variety.	 Solidarity	 contracts,	 he	 says,	 are	 ‘founded	 on	 ideas	 of	 fair	distribution	or	equitable	allocation	of	social	burdens	and	profits’	and	are	contractual	in	the	sense	that	they	are	based	upon	a	contractual	relationship	of	all	with	each	before	and	beyond	 any	 element	 of	 intention;	 in	 other	 words,	 unlike	 the	 classical	 private	 law	 of	contract	 it	 is	 not	 the	 exercise	 of	 the	will	 of	 rational	 individuals	 that	 founds	 solidarity	contracts,	but	the	relationships	of	interdependence	amongst	all	and	each.	
This	 has	 consequences	 for	 our	 understanding	 of	 welfare	 measures	 and	 laws.	 So,	 for	example,	social	insurance	for	industrial	accidents	is	not	based	on	a	notion	of	individual	guilt	or	fault	or	responsibility	(assigning	blame	to	the	employer	or	the	co-workers),	but	on	 the	 idea	of	 the	 ‘socialisation	of	 responsibility’.	This	 takes	as	 its	 focus	 the	collective	relationship	between,	say,	employers	and	employees	(production	is	a	collective	effort),	and	works	on	the	idea	of	settlement	of	conflicting	rights	between	the	parties	based	on	notions	 of	 fair	 distribution	 or	 equitable	 allocation	 of	 social	 burdens	 and	 profits.	Consequently,	 Ewald	describes	 social	 law	 as	 a	 law	of	 groups;	 a	 law	of	 inequalities,	 in	that	 there	 is	 an	 assumption	 that	 there	 exist	 inequalities	 between	 human	 beings	 and	classes	 and	 that	 these	must	 be	 compensated	 or	 corrected	 –	 social	 law	 restores	 upset	equilibria/balance;	a	law	of	positive	discriminations;	a	law	of	‘mutual	concessions’	and	tolerance	between	rich	and	poor,	individual	and	social	interests.	
In	 summary,	 while	 formal	 rational	 law	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	 liberal	 legal	 form	advocated	by	neoliberal	theorists,	social	law	represents	a	departure	from	this	form.	As	Ewald’s	work	 illustrates,	 the	 arrival	 of	 the	welfare	 state	 signalled	a	 transformation	 in	the	form	of	law	–	from	one	focused,	for	example,	on	the	freedom	of	individuals	to	set	the	terms	of	 their	own	agreements,	 to	one	 in	which	courts	were	prepared	 to	 imply	 terms	into	contracts	 in	order	 to	reflect	policy	goals	such	as	 the	protection	of	weaker	parties	
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against	 the	 powerful	 –	 tenants	 vis-à-vis	 landlords,	 say;	 or	 the	 curtailment	 of	 private	property	rights	in	the	name	of	the	public	interest.	This	is	not	to	say	that	liberal	law	and	the	 liberal	 legal	 form	 disappeared	with	 the	 emergence	 of	 social	 law	 and	 the	 welfare	state;	it	is,	however,	to	say	that	the	form	and	underlying	logic	of	social	law	differed	from	formal	rational	law	and	the	liberal	legal	form	with	which	it	is	associated.	
In	 light	 of	 this	 exposition	of	 the	differing	 logics	 of	 formal	 rational	 law	and	 social	 law,	what	 can	 be	 said	 of	 the	 legal	 form	 underlying	 the	 types	 of	 law	 that	 have	 come	 to	prominence	in	the	context	of	the	reforms	to	the	NHS	outlined	above?	On	the	one	hand	these	 laws	 are	 indicative	 of	 formal	 rational	 law.	 Thus,	 the	 possibility	 of	 applying	competition	 law	 to	 ensure	 the	 absence	 of	 anti-competitive	 behaviour	 introduces	 a	degree	of	formal	equality	into	the	NHS	commissioning	process;	and	the	use	of	contract	law	as	the	legal	mechanism	upon	which	PPPs	rest	stresses	the	importance	of	the	formal	notion	 that	 agreements	 freely	 entered	 into	 between	 parties	must	 be	 upheld.	 Possible	substantive	 inequalities	 between	 the	 competing	 parties	 gain	 no	 recognition	 under	 a	form	 of	 law	 concerned	 only	 with	 formal	 equality;	 nor	 do	 the	 concrete	 detrimental	consequences	–	such	as	the	closure	of	hospital	wards	or	indeed	entire	hospitals	–	that	may	flow,	for	instance,	from	the	need	of	NHS	Trusts	to	settle	the	high	interest	payments	associated	with	PPPs.	Competition	and	the	honouring	of	contractual	obligations	(pacta	
sunt	servanda),	rather	than	the	ideas	of	fair	distribution	or	equitable	allocation	of	social	burdens	 and	 profits	 that	 Ewald	 identifies	 as	 structuring	 social	 law	 and	 solidarity	contracts,	are	the	norms	underlying	the	laws	that	constitute	the	markets,	and	entry	of	the	private	sector,	being	facilitated	within	today’s	NHS.	
This	 identification	 of	 formal	 rational	 law	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 NHS	 is	 somewhat	complicated,	 however,	 in	 that,	 despite	 appearances,	 it	 is	 not	 entirely	 devoid	 of	 any	
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element	 of	 collectivisation	 or	 socialisation.	 This	 is	 apparent,	 for	 instance,	 in	 the	allocation	 of	 risk	 within	 contracts	 framing	 PPPs,	 which	 is	 often	 assumed	 by	 the	government	rather	than	the	private	sector.	As	an	example,	Allyson	Pollock	explains	that	NHS	 Trusts	 that	 wish	 to	 terminate	 contracts	 for	 the	 provision	 of	 services	 by	 private	consortia	on	the	basis	of	poor	performance	must	still	pay	the	consortia’s	financing	costs	despite	 their	 being	 at	 fault.	 Here,	 it	 is	 suggested	 that	 contract	 creates	 a	 legal	 bond	between	citizens	and	capital	through	which	responsibility	and	liability	for	the	economic	risks	–	in	the	form	of	the	financial	debts	and	interest	accrued	by	the	private	sector	–	and	associated	potential	social	harms,	such	as	lack	of	availability	of	health	care,	of	PPPs,	are	socialised	 or	 collectivised,	 not	 between	 the	 contracting	 parties,	 but	 amongst	 citizens	themselves.	Through	the	medium	of	the	PPP	contract,	a	strict	liability	is	imposed	upon	a	non-contracting	 collective	 body	 –	 taxpayers.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note,	 though,	 that	 this	form	of	socialisation	could	not	differ	more	from	the	logic	of	socialisation	underpinning	the	 solidarity	 contracts	 that	 Ewald	 identifies	 as	 defining	 social	 law	 –	 one	 which	 is	directed	towards	ameliorating	the	inequalities,	social	and	economic	harms,	and	skewed	distribution	 of	 social	 burdens	 and	 profits	 produced	 by	 the	 operation	 of	 capitalism.	Rather	 than	pursuing	such	objectives,	 the	manner	 in	which	PPP	contracts	are	 framed,	and	 the	 form	 of	 socialisation	 that	 structures	 them,	 are	 geared	 towards	 the	 needs	 of	capital	rather	than	towards	the	protection	of	those	requiring	access	to	publicly	funded	health	care.	
As	with	workfare,	one	can	witness	a	politics	of	depoliticisation	at	work	here.	For	 this	novel	 form	of	socialisation	 through	contract	–	an	essential	 component	of	 the	practical	implementation	of	neoliberalism	and	the	shaping	of	the	neoliberal	state	in	the	context	of	health	 care	 –	 is	 occluded	 by	 a	 politics	 of	 publicly	 funded	 health	 care	 that	 is	 actively	
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constructed	around	a	discourse,	inter	alia,	of	value	for	money,	the	unsustainable	costs	of	the	 NHS	 (both	 in	 terms	 of	 treatments	 and	 personnel),	 bureaucratic	 inflexibility	 and	mismanagement,	 and	 patient	 empowerment	 through,	 amongst	 other	 things,	 the	expansion	of	choice.20	These	forms	of	discourse	not	only	demonstrate	a	core	function	of	the	 neoliberal	 state	 –	 which,	 in	 Wacquant’s	 terms,	 is	 the	 fabrication	 of	 collective	representations	of,	in	this	case,	the	NHS;	in	doing	so,	they	succeed	in	both	obscuring	the	structures	put	 in	place	 to	 facilitate	 the	neoliberal	 vision	 for	 the	NHS	and	 suppressing	potential	 conflicts	 and	 struggles	 over	 the	 very	 meaning	 and	 shape	 of	 the	 politics	 of	publicly	funded	health	care.	
The	 conclusion	 that	 flows	 from	 the	 foregoing	 analysis	 is	 that,	 while	 the	 types	 of	 law	constitutive	 of	 the	 neoliberal	 reforms	 taking	 place	 within	 the	 NHS	 are	 of	 the	 formal	rational	 variety	 –	 a	 legal	 framework	 of	 abstract	 general	 rules	 facilitating	 competition	and	the	operation	of	freedom	of	contract	–	they	are	also,	at	least	partially,	structured	by	a	 logic	 of	 socialisation	 or	 collectivisation.	 In	 its	 objective,	 however,	 the	 latter	 is	diametrically	opposed	to	the	logic	of	socialisation	underlying	social	law.		
Conclusion	
What	 preliminary	 conclusions	 might	 be	 drawn	 from	 the	 foregoing	 analysis	 of	 the	relationship	between	 law	and	neoliberalism	 in	 the	areas	of	unemployment	and	health	care?	
First,	 if,	 as	 it	 has	 been	 argued	 here,	 neoliberalism	 is	 best	 understood	 as	 a	 political	project	 involving	 the	 state’s	 creation	 and	 deployment	 of	 institutional	 mechanisms	geared	towards	a	society	founded	upon	the	market,	then	social	policy	and	the	law	and																																																									
20	Choice	amongst	NHS	health	care	providers	is	now	a	legal	right	enshrined	in	the	NHS	Constitution.	See	
Department	of	Health	The	NHS	Constitution:	The	NHS	belongs	to	us	all	(2013).	
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legal	 categories	 used	 to	 implement	 this	 must	 be	 taken	 seriously	 as	 important,	constitutive,	elements	in	this	process.	
Secondly,	 the	 form	 of	 law	 encountered	 in	 the	 examples	 discussed	 is	 of	 the	 formal	rational	variety	that	posits	a	legal	framework	of	abstract	general	rules	that	emphasises	formal	 equality	 and	 facilitates	 the	 liberty	 of	 individuals	 to	 choose	 their	 owns	 ends	rather	than	these	being	chosen	for	them	by	an	omniscient	state.	While	this	form	of	law	is	materially	important	in	providing	the	rules	necessary	to	allow	for	the	development	of	markets	and	the	competition	between	actors	within	them,	it	is	also	crucial	symbolically	as	it	helps	the	state	shape	what	Wacquant	refers	to	as	the	‘subjectivities,	social	relations	and	 collective	 representations	 suited	 to	 realising	 markets’.21	This	 feature	 of	 law	 and	legal	 categories	 is	 especially	potent	 in	 the	workfare	 context	where	 the	deployment	of	contract	 along	 the	 lines	 of	 its	 classical	 private	 law	 form	 –	 underpinned	 by	 a	 liberal	political	rationality	–	allows	the	state	 to	shape	the	politics	of	unemployment	around	a	certain	form	of	social	relations	and	subjectivity.	
Finally,	 the	 symbolic	 effects	 that	 law	 and	 legal	 categories	 help	 to	 produce,	 obscure	important	aspects	of	the	neoliberal	political	project	and	curtail	the	possibility,	or	even	the	 need	 for,	 a	 politics	 that	 contests	 the	 coordinates	 of	 the	 contemporary	 politics	 of	unemployment	 and	 publicly	 funded	 health	 care.	 In	 exploring	 the	 types	 of	 law	 and	underlying	 legal	 forms	 and	 logics	 that	 structure	 neoliberal	 reforms	 in	 two	 areas	 of	today’s	 social	 policy,	 the	 hope	 is	 to	 resurrect	 a	 form	 of	 agonistic	 politics	 that	 can	challenge	 this	 politics	 of	 depoliticisation	 characteristic	 of	 the	 neoliberal	 state	 by	bringing	into	view	alternative	principles	upon	which	future	social	policy	and	related	law	might	be	founded.																																																									
21	Wacquant,	op	cit.,	note	1.	
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